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 Researching Identity 
A Critical Realist Approach 
 Abigail  Marks and  Joe  O’mahoney 
 INTRODUCTION 
 Th is chapter is slightly diff erent from the others in the book because it deals 
with a substantive topic of investigation (identity) rather than a type of 
research method (say, interviews or ethnography). Th ere are two reasons for 
this. First, the prominence of identity as a topic in (especially critical) manage-
ment studies has led to methodological polarization between those who see 
identity as a rational, cognitive, and objective artefact and those who see it as 
a highly fragmented construct of language. Th us the (re)defi nition of identity 
that we attempt fi rst in this chapter has strong consequences for the methods 
by which it is studied, which we tackle subsequently. Second, the nature of 
social research means that the identity of the researcher, in our view, must 
be considered in relation to the subjects which they themselves seek to study. 
A clearer understanding of identity will, we hope, support the researcher in 
assessing their own constructions when undertaking any form of study. Many 
of the methods that we later identify as suitable for the study of identity are 
covered elsewhere in the book; the present chapter connects them to a sub-
stantive approach. 
 From the 1980s onwards identity studies have been one of the most prolifi c 
movements in social science. We use the word movement instead of topic 
because, for the most part, its teaching and study has involved a transfor-
mation in thinking that has divided conservatives and liberals as to its util-
ity (Bawer 2012; Windschuttle 2000 ). Much of the division has come down 
to ontological assumptions about what identity actually is (Olson 2007) and 
how consequently it can be researched and studied. We argue that the two 
dominant but polarized positions in this fi eld—social constructionism and 
social identity theory (SIT)—have signifi cant limitations which are based 
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upon ontological weaknesses. We subsequently argue that a critical realist 
ontology can provide a strong alternative to these approaches and, illustrat-
ing this argument with an example drawn from recent research by one of 
the authors, draw out the methodological implications of our argument. In 
doing this, we do not seek to build a specifi c ‘domain level’ theory of identity 
(see O’Mahoney and Vincent, this volume) but instead to provide a broad 
sketch of how critical realism can be used to build bridges between seemingly 
incompatible positions, and assess the implications of this middle position 
for methodology. 
 DOMINANT POSITIONS ON IDENTIT Y 
 Within identity studies, two dominant positions can be traced. Th ey are 
social constructivist, or postmodern, positions drawing on philosophers such 
as Foucault, Derrida, and Lacan, and empirical or positivist standpoints, in 
particular social identity theory (SIT) which builds on the work of Tajfel 
(1971; 1972). 
 Th e former, those which give primacy to the constructive power of dis-
course, are now dominant. Th ese studies, which deny a non-discursive real-
ity (in their ‘strong’ form) or refute any possible knowledge of such reality 
(in their ‘weak’ form), have done much to highlight and question the power 
relationships which generate and sustain social categories such as ‘disabled’, 
‘immigrant’, or ‘terrorist’ and the meanings with which they are associated. 
For post-structuralists, who embrace an ontology which rejects either the 
existence or the possibility of knowledge of a non-discursive realm, there are 
three philosophical issues for a critical analysis of identity. First, in seeking 
data about identity, constructivist accounts need only rely upon describing 
discourses, primarily through interviews with the subjects. As constructivism 
is incapable of judging between the validity of diff erent texts, interviews are 
necessarily taken at face value. Th e possibility of subjects being incorrect, or 
untruthful, about their own identities is logically impossible under an ontol-
ogy which puts terms such as truth, objectivity, or reality in inverted commas. 
Second, an account in which all conceptual tools must ultimately be reducible 
only to discourse weakens the theoretical potential of social constructivism in 
explaining how identity is created, altered, or destroyed (Bhaskar 1989: 60). 
Th ird, as a strong discursive approach dissolves all notions of the individual 
into language games, it generates an anti-humanism which is impotent in 
explaining how resistance is possible in the face of discourses generated by 
organizations, professions, or governments. As a consequence, the emanci-
patory potential of constructivist identity studies is diminished by a failure 
to engage with, or even recognize, the embeddedness of identity in social 
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structures, such as class, where distributions of power can, according to realist 
positions, limit the resources available for building stable or ethical identities. 
 On the other hand, understandings of identity from a social identity tradi-
tion are also subject to limitations. SIT (e.g. Ashforth and Mael 1989; Turner 
1982, 1984)  looks at the degree to which people defi ne themselves in terms 
of their membership of a collective and how their feelings of self-worth are 
refl ected in the status of the collective. Th e approach was originally devised 
by Henri Tajfel who was seeking an understanding of discrimination and fas-
cism. Tajfel et al. (1971) set up a group of experiments—the minimal group 
studies—using school children to examine the mechanisms through which 
people who were previously unaware of each other formed a collective iden-
tity. However, because SIT is derived from experimental studies rather than 
actual empirical phenomena, the body of work has focused less and less on the 
‘real life’ instances of discrimination and fascism that were so close to Tajfel’s 
heart and could be argued to have limited relevance to actual situations. Th e 
minimal group studies involved a particular experimental situation and there-
fore it is problematic to generalize suffi  ciently to form a theoretical position. 
As Hacking (1995: 47) notes, ‘the fact that a given phenomenon is tractable 
enough to serve as an example of a theoretical position does not in any sense 
lend weight to the theoretical argument, since it is likely that such a phenom-
enon may prove equally tractable to other opposing positions’. According to 
social identity theory and self-categorization theory, individuals can develop 
two principal identities. People possess a personal self, which encompasses 
unique, idiosyncratic information about themselves in addition to a collective 
self (or social identity), which encompasses information about the groups to 
which they belong (Tajfel 1972). Social identity is concerned with the extent 
to which individuals feel attached to a specifi c group in addition to the sta-
tus and characteristics of this group relative to other social categories (Tajfel 
and Turner 1986). Despite the acknowledgement of these two identities social 
identity is viewed as the dominant driver for behaviour. 
 When discussing social identity, Tajfel and Turner focus on the collective 
properties of social identity and how activity within a social settling is deter-
mined by social identity. Yet, they take a rather confused position in suggest-
ing that the individual then takes discrete action in terms of decisions to move 
between similar social groups based on individual choice. Whilst there is a 
clear position on the abstracted tendency for an individual to assimilate with 
collective forms of understanding, there is an artifi cial separation of the indi-
vidual as a rational agent and the individual as a social actor within a group. 
SIT also tends to separate individual behaviour from the subtleties of the 
social context and fails to understand how processes of both individual and 
social categorization and representation are embedded in a complex context 
comprising wider cultural practices and material settings (Billig 1985; Condor 
1996; Michael 1990; Wetherall and Potter 1992). Whilst SIT acknowledges the 
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individual self, most action is described in terms of social relationships and 
membership of social groups. As Brown and Lunt (2002) suggest, an individ-
ual may leave an organization not only because of a discredited social identity, 
but also as a result of processes of globalization, fl exibility, and temporal spe-
cialization as well as their own individual role and position within the labour 
market. 
 Th e weaknesses of both the constructivist position and the social identity 
approach to identity emerge, primarily, from their ontological commitments. 
In relation to post-structuralists, the failure to distinguish between ontology 
and epistemology (see O’Mahoney and Vincent, this volume) results in an 
‘invisible’ self that can only collapse into discourse, resulting in explanatory 
weakness and emancipatory impotence (Fairclough et al. 2002). For SIT, indi-
vidual identity appears to be solely determined by group membership with 
little variation in the individual characteristics held by group members. Hence, 
all that is left  are essentialized properties. A  critical realist (CR) account of 
identity addresses these weaknesses. 
 IDENTIT Y’S UNDER-LABOURER 
 In this section we do not seek to promote a specifi c CR model of identity 
and focus instead on illustrating the general implications of CR for identity 
research. We do, however, assume both a distinction between social and per-
sonal identity, and also promote the role of refl exivity in generating agency, 
both of which are consistent with CR (Archer 2003)  and are accepted in a 
broad range of critical literature. Th us, in analysing identity, researchers will 
need to either develop their own domain-specifi c meso-level constructs or 
draw upon existing authors who have developed frameworks that are explic-
itly or implicitly consistent with a realist ontology—such as Goff man (1972), 
Archer (2003), du Gay (2007), Polanyi (1958), or Bourdieu (1977). Caveats 
complete, let us examine the principles of critical realism as they apply to iden-
tity research. 
 Stratifi cation and Emergence 
 A stratifi ed, emergent ontology allows realist researchers to conceptualize dif-
ferent levels or entities upon which identity construction may be dependent, 
but irreducible to (for example, memory or refl exivity), or levels or entities 
which may be dependent upon, but irreducible to, identity (for example, cul-
ture). Emergence is important for two reasons. First, such a position is concep-
tually more sophisticated because it avoids collapsing identity into discourse 
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(downwards confl ation) or assuming that identity is simply as assemblage of 
component parts (upwards confl ation). Second, without the existence of iden-
tity as a distinctive entity, humanity (and the rights associated with it) becomes 
either an assemblage of parts or is ‘disappeared’ to mere fantasy ‘suspended 
betwixt and between. . . subject positions’ (Musson and Duberley 2007: 160). 
Second, through retroduction, emergence helps bridge traditional divides 
between disciplines which study diff erent levels of reality. For example, one 
might feasibly ask ‘what must the mind be like in order to help structure the 
dynamics of identity that we see?’ 1 Even social constructionist accounts oft en 
imply that people have memories, emotions, interests, histories, and imagi-
nation (O’Mahoney 2011). What critical realism provides is an opportunity 
to retroduce such properties without the inconsistency of an ontology which 
denies the possibility of (the knowledge of) their existence. 
 Depth Ontology 
 Critical realism’s depth ontology distinguishes real generative mechanisms 2 
from actual empirical occurrences, and both of these from what researchers 
believe they observe. For research into identity, these distinctions are vitally 
important for two reasons. First, contrary to (constructionist) discourse anal-
ysis, a depth ontology allows for the possibility that a text (for example, an 
interviewee’s account of their identity) is factually incorrect, either through 
mistake or deliberately. Second, a depth ontology allows ‘actual’ events to be 
associated with generative mechanisms that have real but contingent eff ects, 
an approach which, in turn, helps conceptualize how identities change. For 
example, if one represents discourse as a causal mechanism (Banta 2007), one 
can theorize its (lack of) eff ect upon identities at an empirical level as ten-
dencies which are contingent, not only upon confl icting discourses, but also 
upon other mechanisms and entities, including the agency and interests of the 
subjects themselves (Marks and Th ompson 2010) and social structures such as 
class or organizations (Sayer 2005). 
 Th is depth allows identities to be researched as embedded within wider class 
or economic structures. For example, Marks and Th ompson (2010) use Th omas 
Frank’s (2004) account of why many of the poorest citizens of Kansas vote for 
 1  One might replace ‘mind’ with ‘society’ or even with a new term altogether. Indeed, the latter 
statement is an important consideration when assessing the epistemological relativism of critical 
realism (Al-Amoudi and Willmott 2011): one should be refl exive and critical of the language one 
uses in seeking to describe reality. 
 2  Th e ‘mechanism’ language employed by many realists is unfortunate because it conjures 
images of a deterministic relationship between cause and eff ect. However, even a brief reading 
of realist texts show this to be a misunderstanding (Danermark 2002: 199). We have reluctantly 
adopted this term for the sake of consistency with other chapters and the wider CR literature. 
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a right-wing Republican agenda. Frank argues that the conservative movement 
managed to turn class diff erences into a cultural war that involved a ‘systematic 
erasure of the economic’, providing a ‘ready-made identity in which class is a matter 
of cultural authenticity rather than material interests’ (p. 259). Conservatives won 
the ‘heart of America’ by convincing inhabitants of Kansas to vote against their 
own economic interests through a perception of the defence of traditional cultural 
values against radical bicoastal elites. Yet, it is argued that ‘all they (the people of 
Kansas) have to show for their Republican loyalty are lower wages, more danger-
ous jobs, dirtier air, a new overlord class that comports itself like King Farouk—
and, of course, a crap culture whose moral free fall continues, without signifi cant 
interference from the grandstanding Christers whom they send triumphantly 
back to Washington every couple of years’ (p.136). A simple constructionist posi-
tion would have assumed a naive ideological acceptance of conservative values and 
ignored broader cultural and structural determinants of identity. A realist analysis 
may allow the extraction of the complexities of the interplay between interests and 
identity. So, whilst the people of Kansas held interests which could be argued to 
be in line with conservative voting, such as a belief in religious conservatism, there 
were other material factors which they had no control over: the media and the 
wealthy have the power and resources to mould interests or perceptions of inter-
ests as the less wealthy do not have the resources to oppose or resist. 
 Entities and (Potential) Powers 
 From a critical realist perspective, discourse and identities have properties and 
powers that can be retroduced from empirical observations. Analytically, this 
allows the researcher useful distinctions between entities, their properties, the 
potential powers they possess, and the actual powers that are exercised. With this 
framing, discourse has a number of properties, such as signs and meanings, and 
a number of potential powers, such as the ability to construct identities or cre-
ate categories of meaning. However, due to the constraints of the empirical con-
text, potential powers may not be exercised: identities might not be constructed 
because there are counter-discourses or because an agent chooses not to engage 
with that discourse, or because they believe a discourse is misleading or untrue. 
 Th e identifi cation of entities and their properties enables critical realists to 
be more precise when specifying the distinctions and relationships between 
diff erent parts of a system. For example, a common distinction that is made 
by realists concerning the entities of identity is that between personal iden-
tity and social identity (Archer 2000). Personal identity emerges from the 
embodied, refl exive self, in part forged through the interests 3 and actions of 
 3  Th e critical realist account of interests is not one where they can be ‘read off ’ from economic 
(or other) structures, and thus does not fall prey to the charges of essentialism or determinism 
which characterize the post-structural critique of Marxist interests (Marks and Th ompson 2010). 
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that individual. Personal identity is shaped by the experience of being held 
accountable by others and is a result of conscious thought and refl ection as 
well as practical experience and tacit understandings (Webb 2006). Realist 
interpretations of personal identity have a strong focus on internal process 
such as refl exivity, agency, habitus, or memory. Personal identity is oft en rep-
resented as a project to attempt to escape experiences of anxiety and uncer-
tainty, where individual moral judgements result from personal preference or 
feeling rather than from external authority or positions (Jenkins 2004). 
 Such a perspective is closely bound to Marx’s alienation or Durkheim’s ano-
mie—where norms (expectations on behaviours) are confused, unclear, or not 
present. Constructionist positions however, would articulate that the autono-
mous self or subject is nothing more than an ideological notion that deceives 
individuals into misunderstanding their own domination as self-determined 
and therefore accept their own subjugation. Th is presents a passive notion 
of man and of personal identity. Such a deterministic account of identity is 
inconsistent because it confuses organizational prescription with the diversity 
of practical experience and misreads the connections between macro-levels 
of political economy and the micro-level of everyday life and its meaning 
(Giddens 1991; Webb 2004). It is far more profi table to look at individual 
relations with and within organizational power structures and what Jenkins 
(2004) and Goff man (1983) call ‘the interaction order’ where the individual 
interacts with the macro. 
 Social identity, as articulated through a critical realist lens, is the navigated 
position between personal identities and the way in which people believe they 
should be perceived in a social setting. Social identity concerns the actual 
embodiment of the roles and categories that are generated in social structures 
which ‘occurs at the interface of structure and agency’ (Cruickshank 2003: 23). 
Whilst personal and social identities are separate, there is a dialectical relation-
ship between them as the individual is constrained in her choice of personal 
identity by the social identities that society makes available, but by occupying, 
or acting out, a social identity, both the social identity and the individual are 
changed. Th e distinction between personal and social identity is an important 
one because without it what the individual understands and wants their iden-
tity to be becomes confl ated with the opportunities that society off ers. 
 Agency and Structure 
 Agency is central to the critical realist conception of the social world as it is the 
point by which the person and social structure, and therefore, personal identity 
and social identity are reproduced and transformed (Figure 4.1). Such an account 
enables a richer and wider explanation than might a purely discursive account. 
To take an example, Holmer-Nadesan’s (1996) account of university workers 
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illustrates how the discursive controls experienced in their work generated acts of 
resistance, such as articulating alternative identities and dis-identifi cation. Yet the 
focus on discourse, rather than social structure and the person, limits the wider 
implications of the workers’ resistance. To take social structure fi rst, we are not 
told how the workers’ disidentifi cation with their workplace identities aff ected 
their workplace performance, and thus their bargaining with their employers. 
Moreover, we are not told how their action (or absence of action) as a collective, 
or in relation to other collectives (for example unions), might infl uence the social 
rules and norms which govern their activities. In short, a focus on micro-politics 
and discourse elides the connection with structural power and the institutions 
which this might generate. 
 Further, the social constructionist derision of any personal properties as 
‘essentialism’ also limits the consequences of the workers’ agency for their cur-
rent and future selves. For example, the workers’ experiences of resistance, 
exploitation, or the eff ectiveness (or otherwise) of solidarity may have changed 
their plans, interests, and future strategies—concepts highly problematic for a 
constructionist position. Moreover, some workers also may have experienced 
stress, depression, or anxiety, again, concepts oft en derided as ‘psychologizing’ 
by constructionist authors. 
 Of course, the transformative capacity of agency 4 is a human potential, 
rather than an actuality, and the potential of that capacity to be actualized is 
constrained, not only by social structures but also the human’s position in that 
social structure at their birth: ‘we do not make our personal identities under 
the circumstances of our own choosing. Our placement in society rebounds 
 
Social
Identity
Agency
Personal
Identity
 Figure 4.1  Th e Transformative Capacity of Agency 
 4  Many critical realists adhere to Bhaskar’s transformational model of social activity (TMSA). 
For more details on this, see Bhaskar (1989), Joseph (2000), and Collier (1994). 
oxfordhb-9780199665525.indd   73 10/31/2013   5:02:49 PM
Abigail Marks and Joe O’Mahoney74
upon us, aff ecting the persons we become, but also, and more forcefully, aff ect-
ing the social identities we can achieve’ (Archer 2000: 10). 
 Historical Materiality 
 Contrary to constructionist accounts which ‘deny the body’ (Barnes and 
Mercer 2010: 68), realists adhere to an intransitive material reality which is 
independent of the transitive knowledge by which it is described. Th e material 
aspect of identity is not simply its physical performative aspects in the empiri-
cal world (such as wearing clothes, going to concerts, picketing corporations), 
nor even the material resources that enable and constrain identity construc-
tion (for example, wealth, freedom of movement, information architectures), 
but it is also the embodiment in a physical person:  with a sex, a colour, or 
forms of disability. Such physical characteristics do not determine identities, 
either social or personal, but they are not simply social signifi ers, the meaning 
of which is unconstrained and free for the writing. Our materiality is unavoid-
ably packaged with our practice in the world. 
 Th e human body, like society, is held within a stratifi ed, emergent reality. 
‘Our’ neurons, and their relations, constrain and enable emergent properties 
such as memory, learning, imagination, and refl exivity, in a parallel manner 
to that in which our cells and their relations constrain and enable our actions. 
Moreover, these emergent properties have consequences for social identities 
through our agency which feed back into our personal identities through 
experience and refl exivity (Elder-Vass 2010: 89). For example, the poor mem-
ory and spelling of one of the authors led to a dyslexia diagnosis 5 which led to 
fi nding coping strategies which, in turn, facilitated their entry into academia. 
 Th e temporal aspect of materiality is also evident in the generative processes 
which (can) impact upon the body and its emergent properties (Williams 
2001). Th is concerns not just the physical (children tend to grow and aging 
cells tend to deteriorate), but also the mental: memories, for example, tend to 
accumulate and fade. Statements which locate our selves as emergent from, 
but not determined by, our physical and mental structures are not essentialist, 
certainly less so than positions that assume these levels are constructed only 
through discourse 6 . Personal identities are rooted, partially, in our physical 
 5  Th is is not to suggest that dyslexia, or the meanings associated with it, are not a product 
of twentieth- and twenty-fi rst-century discourses and power relations, but that they cannot be 
disassociated with the practices of the embodied self. 
 6  Some go further in this respect and argue that the body has emergent properties which 
respond to, and interact with some aspects of the (aesthetic) world, in a non-discursive (though 
not unmediated) way. For example, Randley (1995) argues that the body’s response to music 
draws on ‘pre-verbal’ constructs—an argument developed by Burr (2009) to include art and 
sex: ‘experience is primarily given through the body and not through language’ (p. 121). 
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and mental structures, and, importantly, our refl ections upon those structures 
and the discourses that seek to locate these in social identities. Th e inclusion of 
refl exivity in the transformational cycle means that the tendencies generated 
by our physiology cannot be framed as determinants. Th e self is a product 
of emergent historical processes, but its refl ection upon these means that its 
future is not determined by them (du Gay 2007; Parker 2009). 
 Criticality 
 Finally, a critical realist ontology provides greater scope for a critical, eman-
cipatory agenda for identity studies than that provided by either construc-
tionist or empiricist accounts. It does so in four ways. First, in distinguishing 
between the real, actual, and the empirical, researchers can diff erentiate 
between espoused and actual identities. For example, if, in 2009, an environ-
mental activist was interviewed about their identity, a researcher may have 
assumed they had (inhabited, constructed, displayed, etc.) an identity asso-
ciated with this position. However, when, in 2010, it was revealed that the 
activist was an undercover police informant this is not simply a matter of 
ironic juxtaposition or a collage of confl icting identities, but a discovery of an 
untruth—an important discovery in all but constructionist science. 7 Second, 
the location of identity in an emergent stratifi ed ontology allows the conse-
quences (and antecedents) of identity to be located and better described. In 
the example above, the policeman’s identity (and claimed identity) has con-
sequences for both the reproduction of state power and surveillance, and, 
perhaps, the psychological tensions which might emerge from maintaining 
two confl icting identities simultaneously. Th ird, by identifying the enablers 
and constraints of potential identities, critical realists can better describe the 
psychological and social barriers to the construction of emancipatory iden-
tities and the agency with which they are enacted. Finally, the location of 
discourse and identity within a framework of structural power and inequal-
ity allows critical realists to link the ideology of power relations with social 
and personal identities that emerge from that power. Of course, construction-
ist studies drawing on Foucault have successfully demonstrated how this is 
achieved at a micro-level, but they oft en forget that Foucault was a realist who 
sought to locate discursive eff ects in a wider structural framework of power 
(Al-Moudi 2007; Pearce and Woodiwiss 2001). As such, ‘critical realism shift s 
 7  Th is is not to say that the earlier account was not important and did not have causal eff ects. 
In the recent case of this occurring (Evans and Lewis 2012), the police offi  cer admitted develop-
ing sympathies for the activists. 
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the direction of discourse analysis away from a single stranded focus on the 
symbolic representation and communication of constructed worlds towards 
a much broader concern with the political economy of discursive formation 
and its long-term institutional eff ects’ (Reed 2000: 528). Th is commitment to 
structural positioning enables critical realism to reveal how interests of social 
groups might be the result of ideological conditioning without dismissing 
them as ‘false’ (Marks and Th ompson 2010). 
 The critical potential of the realist position can be evidenced with refer-
ence to the debate around authentic identities. As many workplace studies 
have found, workers exposed to cultural or normative controls by man-
agement often ‘act out’ their roles (Collinson 2003), maintaining a cynical 
distance between their ‘front stage’ and ‘back stage’ selves (Goffman 1963). 
Yet, for many social constructionists, this smacks of an ‘authentic’ iden-
tity, which is, for them, just another form of essentialism (O’Dougherty 
and Willmott 2009). Thus, any claim by a worker to a real or authen-
tic identity is necessarily ‘imagined’ (Costas and Fleming 2009)  and, in 
any case, appropriated by organizations as another more insidious form 
of normative control, where workers are encouraged to ‘be themselves’ 
(Fleming and Sturdy 2010; Roberts 2005). As a constructionist ontology 
cannot distinguish between the validity of discourses, and cannot accom-
modate the distinction between a personal and a social identity, all identi-
ties are necessarily embedded in dominance relationships. However, the 
realist promotion of human agency and its distinction between personal 
and social identities enables a conceptualization of authenticity which 
is more sophisticated than the relativist version for two reasons. First, it 
allows the researcher to accept ‘acting out’ as precisely that—a refusal on 
behalf of the employee to engage their personal or social identities with 
workplace demands, even if their actions are strictly controlled. Second, it 
also allows the researcher to verify some of the claims of a participant as to 
the validity of their claimed authenticity. For example, if a worker claimed 
the identity of an anti-managerialist, left-leaning, unionist but consist-
ently acquiesced in management demands and broke the picket line, then 
a researcher might reasonably suspect that their claims were problematic. 
It may, therefore, be assumed that there needs to be some degree of mutu-
ality between acted-out and believed-in identities. Richards and Marks 
(2007) found several examples of cohesive teams which resisted manage-
rial control strategies by enactment. Furthermore, Leary and Kowalski 
(1990) suggest that although impressions created by people may reflect 
internal thoughts (e.g. individuals who seek to be viewed as dedicated 
to their organization may truly be dedicated), on other occasions the 
impression maybe entirely false. Individuals can distance themselves from 
organizational scripts. So what they are feeling is separated, or can be 
separated from their performance. 
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 THE CONSEQUENCES FOR RESEARCH 
 Research Questions for the Identity Researcher 
 A critical realist study of identity will concern itself with more than a descrip-
tion of identities and the discourses that describe them. Whilst this might prove 
interesting, empirical descriptions reveal little about the underlying mecha-
nisms about why these identities and discourses exist, upon what they might 
be contingent, and the power relations which sustain them. Of course, many 
constructionist accounts have, de facto, achieved by implying real constraints 
to the power of discourse;  de jure, a constructionist ontology is incapable of 
making such statements (O’Mahoney 2011). Th e ontological precision of criti-
cal realism allows a clearer description of identity, which in turn, has implica-
tions for the types of questions a researcher can ask in seeking to understand 
it. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the key principles of critical realism, their 
implications for identity studies and the types of research questions that CR 
researchers might seek to answer when examining identity. Th e questions are 
not meant to be exhaustive and the categories overlap signifi cantly; however, 
it is hoped that the table will provide a useful prompt for those tackling a rela-
tively new area for critical realist research. 
 A fi nal, important point, is the inclusivity of critical realist research 
agenda. It can ask ‘traditionally’ constructionist questions about the discur-
sive eff ects on identity at the micro-level, and research these in a similar 
manner—but can locate these fi ndings within a wider framework that retro-
duces information about both social structures and the self and the relations 
between them. 
 Th ere are few specifi c consequences of critical realism for types of data col-
lection because ‘methods do not uncover reality (relativist epistemology) but 
rational analysis of phenomena can uncover it (realist ontology)’ (Pujol and 
Montenegro 2009: 85). However, there are three general caveats to this state-
ment. Th e fi rst is the focus of data collection. Whilst critical realists might 
use the same categories of methods as any other research position, they will 
seek to move towards understanding the processes that enable and constrain 
identity construction and discursive activity. Th is means that within any 
method, say interviewing, the interviewer will focus on more than eliciting 
information about discourses, but, where relevant, will also seek to uncover 
biographical and structural information related to the questions in Table 4.1 
(see also ch. 3). 
 Th e second and consequential caveat is that a realist study of identity will 
usually incorporate a multi-level analysis where identity construction is 
framed as an interplay between people, groups, organizations, political and 
economic systems, and social structures. Data collection, therefore, will not 
rely solely on interview data to either elicit descriptions of identities and 
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 Table 4.1  Ten Realist Principles and their Consequences for Identity Research 
 Critical realist 
principle 
 Application to identity studies  Questions for empirical studies of 
identity 
 1.  Causal 
mechanisms 
 Social structures, such as class 
relations, organizations, and 
cultures infl uence identity 
construction through various 
mechanisms, one of which is 
discourse. 
 Identity construction mechanisms 
are enabled and constrained by 
empirical conditions. 
 Humans engage in 
identity-seeking activities which 
draw on social identities to 
construct personal identities. 
 How are personal identities and social 
identities produced in this context? 
Which social structures relate to 
which discourses (semiotics, forms of 
language, descriptions)? 
 What processes and mechanisms 
enable this production? Empirically, 
what enables and constrains the 
working of these mechanisms? 
 How generalizable are these 
mechanisms? How might these be 
explored in other contexts? Th is 
concerns both the workings of a 
specifi c discourse (what mechanisms 
reproduce homophobic identities in 
Uganda?) and discourse more generally 
(how are discourses resisted?) 
 How is discourse created, modifi ed, 
and dissipated? How is discourse 
sustained? What material and social 
resources and structures enable this 
to happen? 
 2.  Depth 
ontology 
 Talk about identities and actual 
identities are not necessarily the 
same thing. 
 Empirical tendencies concerning 
personal and social identities are 
generated by causal mechanisms. 
 Do interviews and other methods of 
data collection elicit similar fi ndings 
about social and personal identities? 
What might explain any diff erences? 
How are social and personal identities 
related in this context? What accounts 
for diff erences and similarities? What 
empirical tendencies are evident in 
representations of social and personal 
identities? Which empirical tendencies 
relate to which causal mechanisms? 
What are the transitive and intransitive 
features of your analysis? 
 3.  Entities and 
powers 
 Personal and social identities 
are distinct, but dialectically and 
relationally intertwined. 
 Entities have properties (which 
distinguish their nature) and 
(potential) powers. 
 What empirical and abstract 
properties and (potential) powers can 
be associated with your analytical 
categories (e.g. social identities, rules, 
organizations, discourse)? How and 
why do diff erent entities interact 
in the ways they do? Are existing 
descriptive categories (entities) 
adequate in enabling explanation? If 
not, can you improve on them? What 
are the conditions under which an 
entity’s power is exercised? Are the 
eff ects of this power contingent on 
contextual factors? 
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 Critical realist 
principle 
 Application to identity studies  Questions for empirical studies of 
identity 
 5.  Emergence  Social identities are emergent 
properties of social structures. 
 Personal identities are emergent 
properties of the self. 
 Retroduction allows fi ndings 
about identity to imply properties 
and powers of the self and social 
structures. 
 How are social identities constructed 
through discourse, rules, organization, 
or social structures? How do people 
construct personal identities? What 
other levels or entities are drawn, or 
relied upon, in this construction? 
How do memories, imagination, 
emotion, refl exivity, and action, for 
example, enable or constrain the 
construction of personal identity? 
What psychological or biological 
structures does such activity imply? 
Given what the empirical fi ndings 
concerning social and personal 
identity, what might researchers 
retroduce about the nature of the self 
and/or society, or the mechanisms 
that link society/the self to identity? 
 6.  Agency and 
structure 
 Agency is an emergent property 
of humans which reproduces and 
modifi es social structures. 
 Refl exivity and agency are distinct 
from discourse. 
 What forms of agency are related to 
the generation, modifi cation, and 
reproduction of social and personal 
identities? How does the agency 
associated with personal and social 
identities reproduce or modify social 
structures and power relationships? 
How and why do historical, 
long-term changes take place in social 
structures? 
 7.  Materiality 
(embodiment) 
 Personal identity construction is 
enabled and constrained by the 
physical body. 
 How does the body enable or 
constrain the construction of personal 
identities or the occupation of 
social identities? How do physical 
(such as disability, race, or sex) or 
psychological (such as memory, 
imagination or refl exivity) properties 
impact on the construction (or 
otherwise) of identities? Are 
traditional categories and descriptions 
of physical and mental structures 
suffi  cient explanation for the 
empirical fi ndings? 
 8.  Materiality 
(other) 
 Material and virtual structures, 
such as architecture and ICT 
enable and constrain social and 
personal identity construction. 
 How do material and virtual 
structures impact upon social and 
personal identities? 
Table 4.1 (Continued)
(Continued)
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discourses, or understand the processes that underpin their generations, but 
instead seek a number of diff erent sources of information to understand which 
entities or levels are important in identity construction and how they infl uence 
each other. 
 Th e third and fi nal caveat is the relationship between the diff erent methods 
used for data collection. Within a critical realist framework, multi-level and 
multiple methods of analysis have diff erent intentions from ‘traditional’ mixed 
methods research. Th e conventional rationale for usage of mixed methods and 
the purpose of triangulation is to use a range of methods in order to validate 
fi ndings (Erzberger and Kelle 2003). Originating in geometry, the view of tri-
angulation is that a position is determined in relation to an objectively veri-
fi able reference point (Modell 2009). Denzin (1989) presents crystallization 
rather than triangulation as an alternative metaphor for data ‘validity’ which 
demonstrates no single truth and the self-validity of diff erent forms of data. 
Crystallization and triangulation each then represent the polarized positions 
of interpretive and functionalist paradigms respectively. If reality is multidi-
mensional and subjectively constructed by those being researched then the 
meanings attached to diff erent empirical phenomena will vary considerably; 
 Critical realist 
principle 
 Application to identity studies  Questions for empirical studies of 
identity 
 9.  Temporality  Diff erent emergent levels of 
identity are associated with 
diff erent temporalities. 
 How does the social biography of 
individuals relate to the identities 
which they construct? How have 
personal and social identities changed 
over time? Why are these identities 
being constructed  now ? What types 
of time or lifecycle are associated with 
the identities that are constructed 
and the processes that enable and 
constrain them? What temporal 
dynamics characterize the activity of 
other structures, entities or discourses 
at play in this environment? 
 10.  Criticality  Power  What forms of power are exerted 
through the mechanisms (including 
discourse) which construct identities? 
How do humans seek to resist the 
discourses that might generate 
compliant or normative identities? 
How does this resistance modify 
the structures of dominance in the 
empirical context? 
Table 4.1 (Continued)
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however, true to a critical realist position, the complexity of empirical phe-
nomena could be compromised by attempting to fi nd convergence (Modell 
2009). As Fielding and Fielding (1986) note, converging and diverging causal 
explanations originating from diff erent methods may merely obscure or 
mirror the co-existence of competing accounts inherent in a complex and 
confl icting world. 
 In order to tackle these contradictory positions on triangulation, and to 
acknowledge openness to the idea of divergence of information from dif-
ferent methods (which can be argued is one of the reasons for using email 
data, below), Modell’s (2009) critical realist interpretation of triangulation 
should be mentioned here. Modell argues that converging or diverging 
meanings informed by mixed methods enquiry should only be a starting 
point in interpretation. So, for example, organizational documentation 
and focus groups need to be viewed as distinct from any narrative cre-
ated during a research interview or via a questionnaire, where a participant 
potentially has the time to present a position that they feel comfortable 
expressing. 
 Consequences for Data Analysis 
 A critical realist study of identity will seek to reveal the mechanisms that ena-
ble and constrain identity construction. Th is will involve implicating specifi c 
social structures and their infl uence on identity and, implicitly or explicitly, 
suggesting the properties of the individual that are involved in the produc-
tion or alteration of these structures. Furthermore, the research might give an 
indication of the extent to which these entities and their powers are generaliz-
able and the extent to which the empirical context is important in enabling or 
constraining these powers. 
 The most common route to achieving this is retroduction. Moving from 
empirical findings to causal mechanisms by asking ‘what must the world 
be like in order for these findings to be possible?’ However, in reality, such 
a step can be presumptuous or unrealistic. Depending on the research 
questions, a researcher might, from an inductive perspective, seek first to 
develop codes which provide some abstraction which can make retroduc-
tion easier. Others, taking a more deductive approach, might begin with 
a theorization that they find convincing, for example that of Bourdieu or 
Archer, and use this to provide an explanatory framework for their find-
ings. Others still might compare their findings against an array of different 
theoretical explanations and abduct a ‘best fit’ for their data. Again, the 
specific methods by which data is analysed will rarely differ from those 
from other ontological perspectives, but their direction and purpose may 
differ significantly. 
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 IDENTIT Y IN VIRTUAL TEAMS 
 Th is section will report on the process and outcomes of research that looks 
at identity in virtual teams (see Au and Marks 2013), with a critical real-
ist approach to triangulation. Th is research examined four organizations 
and seven teams across seven diff erent countries and followed forty-two 
employees. As this chapter is focused on methods rather than outcomes 
we only report on data from one organization. Th e company concerned is 
an international shipping fi rm based in Asia. Th e head offi  ce of the organ-
ization is located Singapore. Th e employees within these teams operated 
between the UK and Singapore. In total, there were twenty-eight employ-
ees across the four teams, working on sales and marketing, trade, customer 
service, and fl eet management. Th e organization was studied over a period 
of three months. Non-participant observation was undertaken in both the 
headquarters in Singapore and in the London offi  ce. Th is process involved 
sitting in meetings, listening to interactions between project members, and 
observing videoconferences and teleconferences. Twenty-seven of the par-
ticipants were interviewed and the full portfolio of email exchanges between 
the virtual team members were gathered, covering the three months of data 
collection. 
 One of the key tools in the process of triangulation was the analysis of email 
exchanges. Email can potentially reveal insights into informal interactions and 
concealed attitudes. Yet, email can also be a formal presentation of a position 
and deliberately constructed to be a written record of a particular event or 
action. Th is research employed email alongside other forms of data—inter-
view and observation—so that the particular biases of each can be understood 
and compared. Th e analysis of the data looked at the presentation of identity 
and located key events to illustrate the enactment of identity for particular 
individuals and teams. Th ere was no attempt at convergence of explanations, 
as is conventionally the case in triangulation, as such a process is incompatible 
with a realist position: triangulation views reality as unifi ed, readily observ-
able, and objective and hides important diff erences in situated meanings 
(Modell 2009). Th e interview process explicitly asked participants to discuss 
their identifi cation with the virtual team. Th e responses to this question were 
generally positive. For example, Frank and Chris, team leaders on the same 
project attested to the unity of their working relationship and strength of the 
team during the formal interviews. 
 ‘I am happy and feel proud to work with (the organization) as now people like to 
work for us—they like to work for our ships. I have a good team now. . . they give 
us ample support so we can drive things’ (Frank). 
 ‘I can identify with my (virtual) team because the team identifi es with us’ 
(Chris). 
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 Th e interviews refl ected a presentation of identity which appeared to be as 
the interviewees wished to present themselves or a perception of identity that 
would be favoured by the interviewer. A social identity perspective would take 
these comments as a literal account and, ironically, a constructionist account 
would also adhere to the truth of the text. Whilst there could well be a lit-
eral explanation for these statements, a critical realist interpretation opens up 
a number of possibilities which are hidden by the two dominant positions 
on identity. Th e team identity could be the presentation of a social identity 
that may diff er from a personal identity and could be the product of collective 
interests being represented as a function of structural pressures. If the pres-
entation of such attitudes is a refl ection of personal identity, then it could be 
argued to be a product of the anxiety of moral judgements resulting from a 
personal preference. As a presentation of social identity there is the possibility 
of anxiety of the moral judgements place by the researcher. 
 Importantly, by using multiple methods we can realize the critical realist 
potential for the analysis of a stratifi ed, emergent reality. If only interviews or 
possibly interviews and an organizational survey had been used, there would 
likely have been a fairly positive display of identity with the virtual team. Th is 
was probably perceived as refl ecting well on employees and the organization. 
Yet, by using Modell’s (2009) position on triangulation and a variety of meth-
ods, we can see many potential levels of interpretation and account for phe-
nomena. Observation notes taken in the Singapore offi  ce (and incorporating 
Chris and Frank) present a very diff erent story to that presented during the 
interviews. 
 Abridged Observation Record from 12th September:
 Frank (Project Two, Singapore Offi  ce) was engaged in a discussion with a UK col-
league regarding the allocation of space in shipping vessels. Frank wished to fi ll 
the vessel and to maximize profi t. However, Chris (UK Offi  ce) was looking for the 
lowest freight charge that he could off er to his customer. 
 Frank picked up the phone and it was Chris. Chris asked about reducing the 
quote from $1300 to $1100. Frank refused. Conversation ends abruptly. Frank 
rushes into his manager’s offi  ce. Aft er twenty minutes Frank emerges and rushes 
to the water cooler. He looks angry and frustrated. 
 When Frank was back at his desk I asked him what happened. He said he was 
‘frustrated’. ‘Sometimes I wonder how come they cannot understand and we have 
to explain again and again. In the whole day I will get emails discussing the same 
thing again and again.’ 
 Aft er 10 minutes Frank opens his email and starts to reply to Chris. He men-
tions that ‘our team guideline is “never put your emotion in email” ’. When Frank 
fi nishes his email to Chris he states that he rejected Chris in a polite way. He says 
to me that replying to an email showing your negative emotions by writing in a 
sarcastic way is unprofessional. 
 When asked about electronic communication in an interview, a member of 
Frank’s team from Singapore stated that ‘Working with people from the UK, 
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we face problem in communication. Th ey are not following rules and proce-
dures. . . Th ey oft en change things without notifying us. . . I would highlight their 
shortcomings in two lines but they would come back with twenty lines. Maybe 
this is a cultural problem. My impression is that UK people are laidback so I have 
a bad impression towards them.’ 
 Much of the data from this project revealed a gap between individuals’ 
articulation of workplace relations in an interview situation and practice 
as identifi ed by observation and via interactions over email. While some of 
the interview participants admitted that perceptions of cultural diff erences 
impacted on working relationships and importantly on identity, the majority 
claimed no such eff ect and maintained that virtual team identity was strong 
and salient. Yet, email exchanges were frequently tense. Th ey further suggest 
that individuals, as a critical realist interpretation would allow, either present 
an impression that may represent internal thoughts or deliberately present an 
entirely false impression (Leary and Kowalski 1990). Either way, individuals 
are separating the presentation of identity from internal thoughts. 
 Below is an extract of an exchange between Tim (a Portuguese employee in 
the UK offi  ce) and Sarah (a local employee in the Singapore HQ). 
 Aft er waiting for some weeks for a special rate for  Customer X , I had to say in the 
end to our customer that we are not interested in his cargo. It is now your turn 
to tell us where you need the boxes and the rates that you can off er. (Written by 
Tim, 19th December) 
 We can all be anxious to secure shipments but on the other hand I do appre-
ciate email ethic where tone is concerned. Where there is urgent matter, there’s 
always a phone. (Written by Sarah, 22nd December) 
 You are right! Ethic is quite important.. But please explain to me why we have 
to wait for such a long period of time. Why do we have to send reminder and 
reminder? Is that ethic as well? We did call around, did friendlily ask our cus-
tomer. On 09/01 we gave you the details. Today we are 14 days later. . . . Do you 
really think I can do this more oft en? I remember the last issue where you disap-
pointed me as well and we did not get a reply at all. . . Maybe we should discuss 
ethics in the other way round? With very friendly greetings from a frustrated 
agent which will not be able to arrange bookings and to claim any commission 
which would be our income. . . (Written by Tim, 23rd January) 
 Nonetheless, it should be noted, that in the formal interview, Sarah was very 
positive about working with people from diff erent cultural backgrounds and 
about her identity with her virtual team. 
 When interacting with people from overseas I get to know their culture, working 
style and the experience gained broadens my knowledge. Also, I get a change to 
meet up with the members once in a while so to me, it is quite an eye-opening 
experience.. I can identify with virtual teams as well as teams in the HQ. 
 Th is evidence points to a dialectical relationship between social and personal 
identity and suggests that social identity maybe a result of either impression 
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management or the pressures of social structures on identity formation and 
presentation. Th rough the research interview, the process of ‘acting out’ iden-
tity can be observed, not just for the sake of management but for the purpose 
of a more general ‘front’. Yet, cultural diff erences mediated through ICT and 
other modes of remote working indicated high levels of confl ict and limited 
identifi cation with the team. If there had been a total reliance on one method, 
the outcome of the research would be very diff erent. Th e interviews would 
have presented a corporatized self (constructionist interpretation) or a suc-
cessful project of social identity creation (social identity perspectives). Th e use 
of multiple methods allows a context-specifi c analysis via attempts to position 
theoretical insights through variations in context-specifi c meanings. 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 Th is chapter has identifi ed weaknesses in the two dominant approaches to 
identity studies and argued that they are, at root, weaknesses of an ontologi-
cal nature. Subsequently, we argue that critical realism off ers opportunities to 
promote a non-determinist, non-reductionist version of identity, which dis-
tinguishes between social identity, the roles in social structure which humans 
imperfectly inhabit, and personal identity, the individual’s own beliefs. Th ere 
is, we argue, a dialectical relationship between these two phenomena, medi-
ated through agency. Th ese are high-level commitments which researchers can 
draw upon to create their own, domain-specifi c models of identity. 
 Th e example we have off ered here provides an insight into one of the 
authors’ attempts to do just this. It highlights that a realist approach enables 
the researcher to identify claims of identity which might be ‘front stage’ or 
even misleading—an important commitment that constructionist approaches 
would fi nd problematic. It also suggests an important distinction between the 
formal roles that organizational structures might demand and the individual 
beliefs and norms—a distinction that is diffi  cult under social identity theory. 
In short, we hold that the sophistication and sensitivity of the concept of iden-
tity requires an ontology that is of equal rigour. 
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